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Pepper: The Philosophy of Julius Seelye Bixler

IN HONOR
OF

DR. J. SEELYE BIXLER
President of Colby College, 1942-1960

When I first made the acquaintance of Dr. J. Seelye Bixler, he was
a professor at Harvard and I was a member of the Harvard daily chapel
choir. When Dr. Bixler spoke in chapel the members of the choir-a
group of crass mercenaries who were paid to sing, rather than idealists
who came to pray-actually listened to the sermon. He thus impressed
me early, and he has impressed me ever since.
One of the rewards of coming to Colby in 1957 was the privilege
of working in close association with Dr. Bixler, learning the mysteries
of college administration from one of the great personalities among
college presidents in our day. These pages will suggest some of the
measure of the wisdom which governed his official actions, as well as
some of the warmth of his personality which set the tone for Colby
College for eighteen years.
ROBERT E. L. STRIDER
President, Colby College
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THE PHILOSOPHY OF JULIUS SEELYE BIXLER
By

STEPHEN

C.

PEPPER

IN studying Bixler's philosophy one does well to keep in mind

that he, is as much a theologian as a philosopher. 'This combination of philosopher-theologian is a special asset in these
present days when the usual combination is that of philosopherscientist. It makes it possible for Bixler to see quite clearly
where frequently philosophers have gone overboard in their
eagerness to develop and conform to the concepts of science,
which essentially means the concepts of physics and mathematics.
Bixler conceives that a central aim of philosophy is that of
attaining an overall view of the world-a view that will include
in its survey not only things intellectual but also things practical
and emotional, values as well as facts, religion as well as science.
There are truths from religion as well as from science. A
philosophy which restricts its concern to the results of the
sciences is inadequate to human experience.
His general attitude in these respects is clearly summarized
near the beginning of a scholarly article where he is at particular
pains to give his thoughts precise statement. The title of the
article, "The Problem of Religious Knowledge," of itself prefigures his considered philosophical judgment. He maintains
that there is religious knowledge. To many it may seenl strange
that there should be any issue about this. Yet this has been
questioned by both theological and philosophical schools.
Here is the condensed statement of Bixler's position: "( 1)
That the term 'knowledge' should not be restricted by a positivistic empiricism to judgments confirmed by sense data alone,
but should be expanded to include (a) systematic knowledge
of the metaphysical type, (b) knowledge of ideals vvhich are
possibilities of experience and determinative of actual reflective
experience, and (c) an interpretation of the world as a whole
on the basis of such knowledge of ideals.
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"( 2) That although religion lacks the preciseness of science
and uses methods which often do not allow for exact scientific
confirmation, its closest analogy, nevertheless, is with the knowledge situation, since, like knowledge, it presupposes participation in relationships that are as reasonable as they are universal
and necessary.
"( 3) That 'faith' stands for practical loyalty to ideals and to
the power which is working to realize them. Insofar as faith
so understood implies beliefs, these are expressions of convictions to the appropriateness of voluntary commitment rather
than statements of opinion about matters of empirical fact.
Such beliefs cannot receive verification in the scientific sense,
but they may appeal to a typ,e of practical verification leading
to an assurance which cannot be called arbitrary.
"Let us define experience as 'what happens when a self
meets a world,' knowledge as 'well grounded beliefs expressed
in critical judgnlents,' value as 'what is reasonably considered
to be an authoritative norm for conduct appreciation or reflection,' religion as 'devotion to ideal values and to the power
which is at work to nlake thenl actuaL'" (Philosophical Review, November 1942).
The whole of Bixler's philosophy, I believe, lies as in a kernel within these statements. His numerous articles and books
are expansions of one or another of the theses laid down here.
It is an extraordinarily condensed epitome of a comprehensive
philosophical position.
Let us look first at what is denied. Bixler in this and other
writings spends a good deal of space in the expansion of these
denials. He picks out two extreme schools of contenlporary belief for attack as examples of what he regards as destructive of
his broad and tolerant philosophical attitude. These are the
logical-positivist school in philosophy, and the existentialist
Barthian school in theology. Both are dogmatic in different
ways. And both have an ancient ancestry. So, these criticisms
are not of transitory movements, but of deeply inlbedded trends
of human bias. The one is the bias for a narrow, supposedly
irrefutable intellectualism, the other a bias for an intransigent
anti-intellectualism.
. .
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The logical-positivist position representing today the first of
these biases is briefly this: the model for successful achievement in knowledge is that of science, and the apex of such
knowledge is to be found in mathematics and physics. Mathematics gives logical truth which consists in rigorous deduction
of theorems from postulates and definitions according to rules
which guarantee non-contradiction. A nlathematical system
gives no information about facts, however, though it is essential for scientific deductions. Factual knowledge, or empirical
truth, comes entirely fronl empirical science. In science, hypotheses are framed and by observation and experiment confirmed
through sense experience. The ultimate verification of a scientific statenlent is through sensation, usually visual. The empirical truth of a complicated hypothesis involving many steps
of mathematical deduction and controlled exp,eriment gets verified by the visual observation of a number of pointer readings
on a scale. And in rougher ways the same with all factual
statements capable of verification. The logical-positivist generalizes this situation and concludes that there is no fully justifiable empirical statement that does not find its ultimate verification in sense data. All knowledge of matters of fact-and that
means all knowledge except the mathematical which offers no
factual information-is, for the logical positivist, based on sensation. Any statements that cannot be traced back ultimately
to sensations are, accordingly "nleaningless." By this sweeping
gen,eralization, it turns out that all statements about values are
"meaningless," all metaphysical statements, and all theological
statements.
Bixler, in the sunlmary above, challenges the logical-positivist
position.
He is saying that there is religious knowledge as
well as scientific, and also knowledge of values and much else
beyond sense data. His positive argument, where he shows just
what religious knowledge is, will be brought out later. But a
strong negative argument may be brought up now. He points
out that the positivist position is dogmatic and depends on an
arbitrary definition of knowledge. For if knowledge is so defined, that statements based on other modes of verification than
by sense data would not be knowledge, then any extension of
the range of knowledge is blocked off by definition. All argu-
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ment ceases.
Such blocking off by definition, however, is
clearly dogmatic. Besides, definitions will not obliterate facts.
If other kinds of verification exist, they will continue to exist
and operate whether a school of philosophers does or does not
allow thenl to be defined as constituting knowledge. This
demonstration of a dogmatism inherent in the p,ositivist position
seems to be irrefutable. So, this school of narrow intellectualism no longer stands in his way.
Bixler's treatment of the anti-intellectualist dogmatism of
the Barthians is somewhat similar. They virtually define all intellectualevidence as irrelevant to religion. Consequently, anyone who presents a theology supported by rational arguments
is automatically excluded from the society of the true religion.
As with the positivists, the constructive answer is to produce
a rational religion. But meanwhile negatively it is pertinent to
point out that a rational religion cannot legitinlately be rejected
by defining religion as something irrational. Moreover, Bixler
observes that there is something inconsistent in the irrationalists writing books presenting reasons for the truth of a theory
that is irrational. "That the Barthians in their zeal to avoid
argument are to be numbered today among the most argumentative of men may well give us pause." (Religion for Free
Minds, New York, 1939, p. 63).
Having disposed of these two types of dogmatic opposition
to a theory of religious knowledge, Bixler is then free to develop his constructive theory. Here he begins by calling attention to the reality of ideals. These are norms of values.
And they are effective in hunlan action and experience. Bixler
approaches these norms much in the spirit of Plato. They are
the standards we use in determining what is good and right.
In using them we believe in them. We b'elieve they have a
source outside ourselves. We did not nlake them. And yet we
are not sure we see them clearly. Our beliefs about them have
to be nlodified as we work them out in our experience. The
process of working them out, in applying th·em to our living and
in our communal activity with other p,ersons also working out
their ideals, constitutes a verification process. The result of
this process is a kind of knowledge. It is the beginning of
religious knowledge.
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Religious knowledge is thus distinct from scientific knowledge. It is knowledge of values, while scientific knowledge is
of objects observed by the senses. But it is just as surely knowledge. It is founded on beliefs, and these beliefs are verified
in our acts, in the experience of living. The verification is
not so clean-cut as scientific verification can be, but it is just
as trustworthy.
The verification of our beliefs in values, in our ideals, comes
about through the harmony of their working in our life. They
have to fit together and fit the world in which they operate.
This process is often called coherence. The greater the degree
of coherence our ideals attain the greater the degree of truth
for our beliefs in them. Religious knowledge is thus a search
for a harmony of values.
In this search Bixler points out there is a sort of rhythm
which indicates a sort of philosophical dualism. It is the
rhythm of testing and then thinking and then testing again and
then thinking again. We apply our ideals to situations. They
rarely quite fit. So then we retire fronl experience for a period
of contemplation in which we adjust our ideals to attain greater
coherence. Then we return to experience and test them again.
This rhythm indicates a dualism of values and existence, of
the ideal and the actual. It is a dualism much stressed in religious experience. But it is not a dualism which divides the
world. On the contrary, it pulls the world together. It is just
what leads to greater harnl0ny and coherence. For there would
be no adjustment of our values to overcome conflict if we did
not put them to the test in existence and then think about them
in essence.
This process brings out two other traits of religious experience-nanlely, commitment to one's belief, and the importance of an awareness of suffering. In scientific knowledge
no great stress is laid on commitment. But in religious belief
this is vital. For it is through strong emotional commitnlent
that our religious beliefs, our ideals, get fully tested in the stress
of existence. How else would we become vividly aware of
elements of falseness in our ideals, unless we applied them with
complete commitment? How else could we be assured of their
truth? For if we applied our ideals only half-heartedly, they
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would be only half tested, like putting only half your weight
on the ice to see how strong it is. You do not know whether
it is strong enough to carry you or not. And sometime when
you have to cross the ice, it may break through. So, full commitment is essential to religious belief. But, of course, such
commitment is not contrary to the process of adjusting and harmonizing our beliefs where they are found incoherent. And
there would be still, I take it, certain unchangeable and ultimate commitments such as belief in the truth of coherence itself
as the basis for testing value.
The importance of the awareness of suffering is part of this
process. Bixler nlakes a strong plea for a sense of suffering
rather than a sense of sin. The sense of suffering is what our
ideals are trying to alleviate. The verification of our ideals is
precisely in their power to lessen suffering. So to be aware of
the truth of Ollr ideals is to be aware of the suffering they can
reduce. A sense of suffering carries us and our ideals out into
the world to make it better. But a sense of sin turns one inward and away from life. "Discussion of care, anxiety, and
guilt," writes Bixler, "has its morbid overtones. Youth does not
accept them and neither should we. Pain and death must be
brought out into the open as topics for reflection. The next
step is to treat them with the perceptiveness that refuses to
consider them final" (A Faith that Fulfills, New York, 1951,
p. 75).
On·e can see in such a detail the vast contrast between the
dogmatic, irrational religion of the Barthians, and p,articularly
of Kierkegaard who wallows in anxiety and sin, and the liberal
rational religion for which Bixler is pleading.
From the foregoing analysis of religious. knowledge, Bixler
is led to a highly sympathetic interpretation of mysticism. As
one would imagine, it is not the solitary but the social mystic
that Bixler idealizes. One of Bixler's most eloquent and revealingessays on his p,hilosophy is that on "The Mystic Way"
from his Four Approaches to Belief, published in the Iliff Review, XIII-XIV, 1956.
Bixler is anxious to break down the conception of the mystic
as esp'ousing the irrational and so setting up a chasm between
an ineffable· experience and the processes of ordinary reasoning
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and perception with no communication between the two. "The
great mystics," he says, "do not affirm this. On the further
side of reason, they say, is something of serious import. We
become inarticulate, it is true (they continue), when we try
to talk about it. It must be said also that because it involves
our own personal salvation, we cannot hope to share with you
all the richness of its content. But to define it as some sort of
split-off consciousness is to deny the facts. O'ur experience of
God fits into a pattern with other experiences that are intelligible and communicable. . . . Once attained the vision brings
results that are obviously good."
Bixler interprets the mystic experience as a supremely intense p,eriod of harmonious contemplation preparatory to a return into the stress and conflicts of common existence. It is
one aspect of the cosmic rhythm, referred to earlier, b,etween
values and existence. And then Bixler enlarges upon the innumerable instances of social devotion which have followed
after men have had the mystic exp1erience or a genuine religious
conversion.
Taking mysticism seriously leads to the question of our
knowledge of God. For the mystic feels that he is in communication with God. Bixler asks what in this world would
it be to have communication with God. It would not be literally seeing him or hearing him speak words. Such visions are
the natural but irrelevant elaborations of ecstasy. For communication from God, "the ordinary means for the give and
take of ideas are ruled out from the start," writes Bixler.
"Nevertheless, I venture to say there is an experience common
to all perceptive men and women that is incompletely described
unless the word 'God' is used in accounting for it. . . . Each of
us is aware of a clainl laid upon us to make as much of our
lives as we can. . . . It is the introduction of value that gives
us sonlething we can work on. It is the fact that we are placed
here to do something of a sp,ecial sort, to respond to a particular moral challenge, and to continue to improve our doing, along
with our feeling and thinking that gives us a clue to the nature
of God. . . . The mystic does indeed 'encounter' a reality outside himself. . . . He points to an influence playing on us of
which both reason and conscience approve and which in every
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sense deserves the term 'God-like.' He directs us to the Source
of our values and increases our knowledge of this Source"
( "The Mystic Way" ) .
I give this extended quotation so that Bixler's argument at
this important transition nlay be appreciated in his own words.
It is an argument for the existence and nature of God by way
of our sense of values and our practical commitment to the
endeavor to realize them. It presupposes the reality of values
as earlier established, our intellectual and emotional commitment to them, and lastly the coherence of experience which
verifies them and in which we find ourselves imnlersed whenever
they are about to be realized as true.
This last point is the final one I shall stress in this summary
interpretation of Bixler's p'hilosophy. The nature of God is
found partly in his b,eing the Source of the objective value
norms which guide our living. But it is found equally in the
process of living experience constantly striving for coherence.
It follows that God is with us and working through us in proportion as we are being rational in the broad sense of attaining
harmony out of conflict.
The following passage brings out this point: "There is more
than a grain of truth in the old contention of the idealists that
when our reflection is truly rational, when, as we say, reason
truly 'enters,' then it is not we alone who think but God or the
Spirit of Reason who thinks in us" ("The Mystic Way"). But
we must not think, as the "old idealists" did, that somehow the
coherence is all achieved in a hidden Absolute we cannot see,
so that our struggles are all "appearance" beneath the transcendent "reality" of the Absolute. For Bixler the struggles are
real and there is no transcendent Absolute. But there are objective values for which we may name God as their Source, and
there is a continuous process of realizing these values through
converting conflict and suffering into harmony and coherence.
God is with us in our struggles and this is part of the nature
of God. "God is greater than we b'ut the greatness is of a
sort we know and respect and find good. His difference is not
in kind. . . . If God is the rational and ethical ideal, we can,
however imperfectly, make his will our own, and can coop,erate,
however unworthily in the effort to carry out his purpose"
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(The Faith that Fulfills, p. 60). By identifying part of God's
nature with man's suffering and struggle towards harmony, it
follows that God also suffers. Says Bixler, "Suffering must
characterize the exp,erience of God himself if he is a God of
love" (Ibid., p. 56). It would follow too that he is a changing
God who moves with the whole movement of human experience towards the coherent realization of his values.
Putting all the above together very briefly: There is scientific
knowledge and there is religious knowledge. The first deals
with the organization of the data of perception, the latter with
the exp,eriencing of values. Values have an objectivity beyond
momentary experience and guide it towards coherence which
is a form of rationality. God may be prop,erly identified with
these objective values and with the total movement of experience through suffering and conflict toward harmony and coherence. In this total movement scientific knowledge would be
found to merge and cooperate with religious knowledge.
If this sumnlary of Bixler's philosophy is essentially correct, it is a genuine synthesis of the theological and philosophical traditions. It is an original synthesis. The nearest philosophy to his I know is that of Whitehead in his last mature writings. But there are features in Bixler's philosophy that seem
to be his alone.
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